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IN THE UTAH STATE COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
Case No. 960474-CA 
JOHN SCHWEITZER 
Deffendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a criminal proceeding in which the Appellant, John 
Schweitzer, pled guilty before the Honorable Judge Pat Brian in 
the Third District Court of Summit County, State of Utah, to 
Aggravated Assault, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-103; and Stalking, a Class B Misdemeanor in 
violation of U.C.A. § 76-5-106.5. Mr. Schweitzer appeals from 
the judgement and sentence of the Court. 
Jurisdiction to hear the above-captioned appeal is conferred 
upon the Court of Appeals, State of Utah, pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(e)(Supp 1994), and Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue 1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by 
imposing an inherently unfair sentence that was based on the 
Judges personal emotion and dislike for the Defendant, rather 
than upon the facts of the case? 
Standard of Review* An appellate court will set aside a 
sentence imposed by the trial court if the sentence represents an 
abuse of discretion, such as where it is clear that the actions 
of the judge were so inherently unfair as to merit such a 
finding. State v. Gerrrard. 584 P.2d 885, 887(Utah 1978). 
Issue 2. Did the Trial Court abuse it1 s discretion by 
sentencing Defendant to consecutive rather than concurrent 
sentences without taking into consideration: i)the Defendant' s 
relatively clean criminal record; ii)the Defendant' s lack of 
priors involving either weapons or violence; and iii) the 
Defendant' s rehabilitative needs? 
Standard of Review. An appellate court will set aside a 
sentence imposed by the trial court if the sentence represents an 
abuse of discretion, such as where the trial judge fails to 
consider all legally relevant factors. State v. Hollandf 111 P.2d 
1019 (Utah 1989). 
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Issue 3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by 
ordering, as part of Defendant' s criminal sentence, that he be 
required to pay over $5,000.00 in allegedly delinquent child 
support, despite the fact that the matter of both child support 
and paternity where at issue in an independent civil action? 
Standard of Review. An appellate court will set aside a sentence 
imposed by the trial court if the sentence represents an abuse of 
discretion, such as where the sentence imposed exceeds the limits 
prescribed by law. State v. Shelby. 728 P.2d 987, 988 (Utah 
1986); State v. Jolivet.712 P.2d 843, 844 (Utah 1986); State v. 
Peterson. 681 P.2d 1210, 1219 (Utah 1984); State v. Harris, 585 
P.2d 450, 4553 (Utah 1978). 
Issue 4. Does the sentence imposed by the trial court 
violate Article One, Section Nine of the Utah Constitution which 
prohibits treating an arrested or imprisoned person with 
u
unnecessary rigor?" 
Standard of Review. This issue involves a question of law which 
is reviewed for correctness. See generally State v. Penaf 869 
P.2d 932 (Utah 1994) (discussing standards of review). 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Article One# Section Nine# Utah Constitution. 
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall 
not be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be 
inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated 
with unnecessary rigor. 
[Emphasis added] 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401. Concurrent or consecutive sentences-
Limitations . 
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been 
adjudicated guilty of more than one felony offense, whether to 
impose concurrent or consecutive sentences for the offenses. 
Sentences for state offenses shall run concurrently unless the 
court states in the sentence that they shall run consecutively. 
(2) A court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of 
the offenses and the history, character, and rehabilitative 
needs of the defendant in determining whether to impose 
consecutive sentences. 
[Emphasis added] 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45a-2. 
(1) Paternity may be determined upon: 
(a) the petition of the mother, child, putative father, 
or the public authority chargeable by law with the support of the 
child; or 
(b) a voluntary declaration of paternity executed in 
accordance with Chapter 45e, Voluntary Declaration of Paternity 
Act. 
(2) If paternity has been determined or has been 
acknowledged according to the laws of this state or any other 
state, the liabilities of the father may be enforced in the same 
or other proceedings by: 
[Emphasis added] 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a criminal proceeding in which the Appellant, John 
Schweitzer, pled guilty before the Honorable Judge Pat Brian in 
the Third District Court of Summit County, State of Utah, to 
Aggravated Assault, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-103; and Stalking, a Class B Misdemeanor in 
violation of U.C.A. § 76-5-106.5. Mr. Schweitzer appeals from 
the judgement and sentence of the Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On January 10, 1996, the Defendant, John Schweitzer, was 
depressed and was drinking heavily. (R.0342). He had taken a 
large amount of Xanax, a medication that his physician prescribed 
to him for his depression (R. 0342, Presentence Report at 14). 
The primary source of the Defendant' s depression was his 
broken relationship with both Ms. Cathy Cartier and her son, John 
Jr. (Presentence Report at 11,12). Although John had always 
believed that John Jr. was his son, he recently became concerned 
that the child might not be his. (R. 0364). As a result, 
Defendant was involved in a paternity suit with Ms. Cartier that 
had become very nasty. (R. 0117, 0066, 0276, Presentence Report 
at 11-12). Ms. Cartier would not allow the Defendant to see John 
Jr., and was seeking a court order against Defendant which would 
have prohibited him from contacting her. (R. 0117, 0066, 
Presentence Report at 11-12). 
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In an effort to come to terms with his feeling of grief and 
loss regarding these broken relationships, the Defendant was 
receiving counseling from therapist Valerie Hale, Ph.D. 
(Presentence Report at 11-12). Mr. Schweitzer contacted Ms. Hale 
after attending the "Utah Divorce Education for Parents" class, 
which she taught. Id. Although Mr. Schweitzer was not legally 
required to attend this class because he was never married to 
John Jr.'s mother, Mr. Schweitzer attended this class voluntarily 
because he was concerned about the effects of his and Ms. 
Cartier's separation on John Jr. (Presentence Report at 11-12). 
On the afternoon of January 10, 1996, Mr. Schweitzer sought 
the company of his friend Jim Higham. (Presentence Report at 4). 
They first drank at Mr. Higham' s home and later went to Adolph' s, 
a private club in Park City, where Mr. Higham' s wife was working. 
(R. 0210-13, Presentence Report at 4). Both men continued to 
drink at Adolph' s. Mr. Higham drank beer and Mr. Schweitzer 
ordered and was served three Wild Turkey Manhattans. (R. 0219). 
Defendant was halfway through his third drink, and was very 
drunk, when he lost control of his behavior (R. 0219, 0223, 
Presentence Report at 4). 
Although no one was attempting to prevent Mr. Schweitzer 
from leaving the premises, Mr. Schweitzer, in an apparent attempt 
to exit, picked up a bar stool and began smashing the stool into 
a closed door. (R. 0215, 0223). When he could not get the door 
open with the stool, he picked up a glass table and smashed that 
into the door. (R. 0215, 0223). The table shattered. Id. The 
6 
bartender called to Mr. Higham asking him to get his friend under 
control (R. 0216). Mr. Higham grabbed the Defendant from behind 
and started pulling him toward the exit door. (R. 0216, 0232). 
While he was being pulled backwards, Mr. Schweitzer pulled a 
knife and stabbed backwards. (R. 0217, 0025). In doing so, he 
stabbed, and very seriously injured, his friend Jim Higham. (R. 
0238). 
When Mr. Schweitzer realized what he had done he "went back 
to hug his friend [Mr. Higham] and he apologized for stabbing 
him." (R. 0218). Stating "I love you, man. I'm sorry I stabbed 
you." (R. 0218). 
Mr. Schweitzer was arrested and charged by information with 
attempted murder stemming from the incident at Adolph' s. (R. 
0006, 0007). The information was amended to include the charge 
of stalking, despite the fact that the alleged stalking was 
unrelated to the stabbing. (R. 0002J1. The victim of this 
alleged stalking was Ms. Cartier. (R. 0002). The allegations of 
stalking centered around Ms. Cartier and Mr. Schweitzer' s 
paternity dispute. (R. 0002, 0068, 0122-24). Although Mr. 
Higham did not testify against Mr. Schweitzer at the preliminary 
hearing, Ms. Cartier testified regarding the stalking. (R. 0066, 
0206). The emotional impact of Ms. Cartier's testimony 
overshadowed that proceeding. (R. 0066, 0275-0286). It was 
1
 Prior to the Preliminary Hearing, the attempted murder charge was amended to a 
charge of aggravated assault. 
7 
clear from her testimony that she has a great deal of animosity 
towards Mr. Schweitzer. (R. 0066, 0275-0286). 
On April 17, 1996, Mr. Schweitzer made a motion to sever the 
stalking count from the attempted murder charge. (R. 0068). He 
argued that he was entitled to a fair assessment by the jury of 
the attempted murder charge. (R. 0065). He believed that Ms. 
Cartier' s testimony would make that impossible. (R. 0065-68). 
The trial court refused to grant this motion. 
Mr. Schweitzer also made a motion to recuse Judge Brian from 
Defendant' s criminal case. (R. 0125)2. Judge Brian was the 
presiding Judge over the Defendant' s domestic and civil matters 
and had granted Ms. Cartier' s request for a protective order 
against Mr. Schweitzer. (R. 0124). Mr. Schweitzer was concerned 
that the Judge' s exposure to the Defendant' s domestic problems 
and to the ex-parte allegations contained in Ms. Cartier' s 
request for a protective order created a bias and prejudice 
against the Defendant. (R. 0122-25). This motion was also 
denied. 
Ultimately, the Defendant agreed to plead guilty to 
Aggravated Assault, a third degree felony, and to Stalking, a 
class B misdemeanor. (R. 0132). Although the Defendant 
expressed an interest in rehabilitation, the Judge, referring to 
the Defendant as a "clear and present danger," sentenced him to 
consecutive prison terms, ordered that all of his real and 
2
 This motion was never argued. 
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personal property be sold, and ordered that he pay child support 
to Ms. Cartier despite the fact that paternity had not yet been 
established. (R. 0370-72, Presentence Report at 14). The 
Defendant appeals from this Sentence and Judgement. (R. 0161). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Mr. Schweitzer1 s sentence evidences an abuse of judicial 
discretion and should be reversed. The sentence imposed by the 
trial court warrants reversal because it is inherently unfair in 
its severity, given the facts and circumstances of the case. It 
is also inherently unfair in that it was imposed based upon the 
personal emotions and dislike that the Judge felt for this 
Defendant, rather than upon appropriate sentencing 
considerations. 
This sentence should be reversed because the trial court, in 
imposing consecutive sentences, failed to consider the 
appropriate factors. The factors overlooked by the trial court 
were the history and character of the defendant and his 
rehabilitative needs. Basic notions of due process, Utah case 
law, and UCA § 76-3-401 require that these factors be considered 
when imposing consecutive sentences. 
By ruling on a separate civil matter involving the paternity 
of a child claimed to be Defendant' s, while presiding over 
Defendant' s sentencing hearing, and by adding to the Defendant' s 
sentence an order that he pay child support based upon the 
aforementioned ruling, the trial court abused its discretion by 
imposing a sentence that exceeded its legal authority. 
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Finally, by sentencing Mr. Schweitzer to consecutive 
sentences, ordering all of his property, both real and personal, 
sold, and ordering that he pay child support for a child which 
may not even be his, the trial court violated Article One, 
Section Nine, of the Utah Constitution which prohibits treating 
an imprisoned person with "unnecessary rigor." 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE SENTENCE IMPOSED BY THE TRIAL COURT EVIDENCES AN 
ABUSE OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION AND SHOULD BE REVERSED, 
An appellate court will set aside a sentence imposed by the 
trial court if the sentence represents an abuse of discretion, 
such as where it is clear that the actions of the judge were so 
inherently unfair as to merit such a finding, State v. Gerrard, 
584 P.2d 885, 887(Utah 1978); or where the trial judge fails to 
consider all legally relevant factors, State v. Holland, 777 P.2d 
1019 (Utah 1989); or if the sentence imposed exceeds the limits 
prescribed by law, State v. Shelby, 728 P.2d 987, 988 (Utah 
1986); State v. Jolivetf 712 P.2d 843, 844 (Utah 1986); State v. 
Peterson. 681 P.2d 1210, 1219 (Utah 1984); State v. Harris, 585 
P.2d 450, 453 (Utah 1978). 
In this case, the trial court, abused its discretion in all 
of the above-mentioned respects. The sentence was inherently 
unfair. In imposing consecutive sentences, the court neglected 
to consider all relevant factors, and the sentence itself exceeds 
the limits prescribed by law. 
30 
A. The trial court acted in an inherently unfair manner in 
sentencing Defendant. 
Defendant/Appellant contends that the trial court' s sentence 
is inherently unfair and represents an abuse of discretion in 
that it is unduly severe and is the result of the Judge' s 
personal dislike, anger and contempt for the Defendant. Review 
of the appellant' s claim by the Court of Appeals is in keeping 
with the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice which defines the 
objectives of appellate review of sentencing as follows: 
(a) to correct the sentence which is excessive in 
length, having regard to the nature of the offense, the 
character of the offender, and the protection of the public 
interest; 
(b) to promote respect for law by correcting abuses of 
the sentencing power and by increasing the fairness of the 
sentencing process; 
(c) to facilitate the possible rehabilitation of an 
offender by reducing manifest and unwarranted inequalities 
among the sentences of comparable offenders; and 
(d) to promote the development and application of 
criteria for sentencing which are both rational and just. 
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Chapter 20-24, Tables IV, 
Second Edition, pg. 20-1.2. (Emphases added). 
Defendant concedes that sentencing is a discretionary 
matter. However, Defendant maintains that an appellate court 
should reverse the sentence imposed by a trial court when "the 
actions of the judge were so inherently unfair as to constitute 
and abuse of discretion." State v. Gerrardf 584 P.2d 885, 
887(Utah 1978). 
The standard for determining abuse of discretion has been 
defined by the Oklahoma Supreme Court as uany unreasonable, 
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unconscionable and arbitrary action taken without proper 
consideration for the facts and law pertaining to the matter 
submitted." Harvey v. State, 458 P.2d 336, 338 (Okla. 1969). 
In Gerrard the Judge stated that he would sentence Mr. 
Gerrard to a 90 day evaluation. Later that same day, the Judge 
revoked his prior referral and sentenced the appellant to 
immediate confinement at the Utah State Prison. The defendant 
argued that this change in his sentence evidenced an abuse of 
discretion. Defendant claimed that the new sentence was 
improperly based upon the fact that the Judge was angry with him 
for attempting to escape from the courtroom. Mr. Gerrard argued 
that such a motive for sentencing was an abuse of discretion. 
While agreeing with the defendant' s legal theory, the Utah 
Supreme Court disagreed with the defendant' s conclusions about 
the facts. The Court held that the new charges of contempt of 
court and attempted escape constituted an adequate reason for the 
judge to cancel the ordered 90 day evaluation and send the 
defendant immediately to prison. 
Justice Maughan disagreed, writing that: 
Judicial discretion is not personal discretion, all 
judicial power is held in trust for the people, having 
been delegated by them through the Constitution. . . 
Judicial discretion cannot be distorted to camouflage 
or insulate from appellate review a decision based on 
the judge' s personal caprice, hostility or prejudice. 
The granting or withholding of probation rests entirely 
within the discretion of the trial court. If the 
exercise of that discretion is based upon reason rather 
than emotion, it will not be disturbed by this Court. 
12 
Gerrard at 889, (Justice Maughan dissenting), quoting, Spann v. 
People, 561 P.2d 1268, 1269 (Colo. 1977), and, quoting, State v. 
Cornwall, 518 P.2d 863, 867 (Idaho 1974). 
In Spann v. People, relied upon by Justice Maughan in his 
opinion in Gerrard, the defendant was a 39 year-old man who had 
no prior criminal convictions and provided the sole support for 
his wife and five children. He pleaded guilty to the charge of 
killing a neighbor' s calf. The defendant admitted to having an 
alcohol problem and to the fact that he had been drinking on the 
day of the offense. He applied for probation which the trial 
court denied. He was then sentenced to three to five years in 
the penitentiary. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the trial 
court' s order on the basis of abuse of discretion, stating, 
M[jjudicial discretion cannot be distorted to camouflage or 
insulate from appellate review a decision based on the judge' s 
personal caprice, hostility or prejudices." 561 P.2d at 1269. 
Mr. Schweitzer believes that the sentence imposed by the 
trial court in this case was equally fraught with prejudice. The 
severity of the sentence imposed illustrates this point. 
Referring to Mr. Schweitzer as a * clear and present danger", 
(R. 0370), the Judge sentenced Mr. Schweitzer to consecutive 
terms, stating: 
[T]he six months [for the misdemeanor offense] will run 
consecutively to the prison sentence. When the 
defendant is released from the Utah State Prison, the 
authorities of Summit County will go to the prison 
door, they will pick him up, they will bring him back 
to Summit County, and he will serve the six months 
here, and also pay the fine, which is consecutive to 
the one imposed on the third-degree felony. (R. 0372). 
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Despite the fact that an independent civil action between 
Mr. Schweitzer and Ms. Cartier involving the paternity of Ms. 
Cartier' s minor child was pending, (R. 0362, 0365), the trial 
court also ordered Mr. Schweitzer to pay child support as part of 
his criminal sentence, stating: 
[C]hild support [will] be paid in this case. The Court 
is going to impute child support at the rate of two 
hundred and fifty dollars. All arrearages that have 
been accumulated in this case will be paid to the child 
of the defendant, and those arrearages will be paid 
from any assets the defendant has, in real property or 
personal property. (R. 0371). 
Further, the trial court ordered restitution be paid to Ms. 
Cartier, Mr. Higham, and to Adolph's Restaurant. (R. 0370-0373, 
Presentence Report at 7). Although Defendant is happy to pay any 
and all appropriate restitution, Defendant believes that the 
court' s restitution order was unnecessarily harsh. This order 
states as follows: 
every piece of property owned by the defendant . . . . 
vehicles, guns, jewelry, real property in and out of 
the continental United States, every piece of property, 
personal and real, owned by the defendant, as of June 
24, will be liened, the property will be disposed of. . 
. . (R. 0370). 
Mr. Schweitzer' s sentence, taken as a whole, violates Gerrard 
because it is inherently unfair to impose such a severe sentence 
in light of the facts of this case. 
Although Defendant admittedly stabbed Mr. Higham, Mr. 
Schweitzer is not known to be a violent man and has never before 
been convicted of a violent crime. (R. Presentence Report at 8). 
He was drunk and under the influence of drugs when he stabbed his 
friend Jim Higham. (R. 0342). Witnesses to the stabbing have 
14 
testified that moments after the stabbing, when Mr. Schweitzer 
realized what he had done, he hugged the victim and told him that 
he was very sorry. He told him that he loved him. (R.0218). 
Additionally, the presentence investigation reveals that shortly 
after the stabbing, Mr. Schweitzer spoke with his therapist, 
Valerie Hale, PH.D., telling her that he had done a terrible 
thing and he felt very bad about it. (Presentence Report at 12). 
While it is true that Mr. Schweitzer does have a criminal 
arrest record, (Presentence Report at 8), nothing in that record 
supports the trial court' s contention that Mr. Schweitzer is a 
aclear and present danger," or makes sentencing this individual 
to consecutive sentences while stripping him of all of his 
possessions, seem any more proper or reasonable. 
What Mr. Schweitzer' s record does show is an individual with 
a long history of drug and alcohol problems. (Presentence Report 
at 8, 11-13). His last arrest, prior to the one in this case, 
came in 1991 when he was arrested for driving under the 
influence. (Presentence Report at 8). Prior to that, the 
Defendant had not been arrested since 1980, when he was convicted 
of drug possession. (Presentence Report at 8). 
In light of the fact that all of Mr. Schweitzer' s past 
arrests have involved abuse of drugs and alcohol, (Presentence 
Report at 8), his arrest record reveals not a "clear and present 
danger", but instead, a person who could benefit from a 
rehabilitation program. Indeed Mr. Schweitzer has indicated that 
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he would welcome rehabilitation for his problems. (Presentence 
Report at 14). 
Instead of getting this help, he has been sentenced first to 
time at the Utah State Prison, and then, when the Board of 
Pardon' s determines that he is ready to reenter society, he will 
be remanded to the custody of the Summit County jail for six 
months, after which he will be released with no assets, no home, 
and without having reaped the benefits of the rehabilitation that 
he so obviously needs. 
Defendant foresaw this prejudice, and by motion filed on May 
3, 1996, he unsuccessfully sought to have Judge Brian recused 
from this case. (R. 0094). The Defendant's basis for this 
Motion to Recuse was related to a Protective Order against the 
Defendant. (R. 0122-0125).3 This Protective Order was granted 
by Judge Brain based upon the ex parte request of Ms. Cartier, 
the Defendant' s ex-girlfriend, who was involved in a nasty 
paternity dispute with the defendant. (R. 0123-0124). Ms. 
Cartier was also the victim of the stalking charged in the 
present case. (R. 0125). 
Prior to issuing this Protective Order, Judge Brian read and 
considered Ms. Cartier' s written statements, and based thereupon, 
3
 Although Ms. Cartier's request for a protective order was 
sought in December of 1995, this order was not considered and 
granted until March of the following year. Nothing in the record 
explains this delay, however, it is important to note that the 
protective order granted in March contains no allegations that 
the Defendant attempted to make contact with Ms. Cartier at any 
time after the January 10, 1996, incident at Adolph's. ( R. 
0124, Exhibit A). 
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issued the Protectivr Order (R.0123-0124). Ms. Cartier's 
statement (attached herein as "Addendum A") contains many 
allegations of misconduct on the part of Mr. Schweitzer as it 
related to his relationship with Mr. Cartier and which was the 
subject of a pending civil paternity action, also before Judge 
Brian. Defendant believed that the Judge* s exposure to the 
information contained in Ms. Cartier' s statement unequivocally 
created bias against him requiring the Judge's recusal. This 
recusal was not granted. 
It is Defendant' s position that in issuing the restraining 
order, Judge Brian had already formed a belief as to the truth of 
the allegation in Ms. Cartier' s petition, and that this prejudice 
ultimately resulted in Judge Brian imposing a sentence upon the 
Defendant that reflected not the facts of the matter immediately 
before him, but the Judge's attitude and opinion of the 
Defendant, formed on the basis of Ms. Cartier' s unsubstantiated 
allegations. 
As a result of the Judge' s bias and anger, both the 
sentencing procedure and the resulting sentence are inherently 
unfair and evidence an abuse of judicial discretion. Therefore, 
the Defendant' s sentence should be reversed "to promote respect 
for law by correcting abuses of the sentencing power and by 
increasing the fairness of the sentencing process." ABA Standards 
for Criminal Justicef Chapter 20-24, Tables IV, Second Edition, 
pg. 20-1.2. Thereafter, the Defendant should be resentenced 
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according to a fair and just consideration of the appropriate 
factors. 
B. Mr. Schweitzer' s sentence should be reversed because 
the trial court failed to consider all legally relevant 
factors when imposing consecutive sentences. 
Where the trial judge fails to consider all legally relevant 
factors, reversal of a sentence for abuse of discretion is 
proper. State v. Holland, 777 P.2d 1019 (Utah 1989). U.C.A. § 
76-3-401 grants to the trial judge the discretion to run 
sentences either consecutive or concurrent. However, this 
discretion is not unbridled. The statue directs the court to 
consider "the gravity and circumstances of the offenses and the 
history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant." 
§ 76-3-401(2). The statute also favors concurrent sentences: 
1
 Sentences for state offenses shall run concurrently unless the 
court states in the sentence that they shall run consecutively.' 
§ 76-3-404." State v. Strunkr 846 P.2d 1297, 1301 (Utah 1993). 
An additional and highly important factor in deciding 
whether to impose consecutive or concurrent sentences 
is that the Legislature, in enacting indeterminate 
sentencing laws, has opted to give the Board of Pardons 
wide latitude in deciding what a maximum sentence ought 
to be. (citation omitted) The Board is in a far better 
position than a court to monitor a defendant' s 
subsequent behavior and possible progress toward 
rehabilitation while in prison and to adjust the 
maximum sentence accordingly. 
State v. Smith. 909 P.2d 236, 244 (Utah 1995) [Emphasis added]. 
In Strunk the defendant was convicted of kidnaping, sexually 
assaulting and killing a young child in a cruel and depraved 
manner. Strunk at 1301. The court ordered a 90 day diagnostic 
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report on defendant. In this report, a long period of 
imprisonment was recommended for the defendant who was opined to 
be an extreme danger to the community if allowed to be free. In 
view of this, the trial judge ordered that defendant' s sentences 
run consecutively rather than concurrently. The practical effect 
of this was that defendant would spend a minimum of twenty four 
years in prison before he would be eligible for parole. The Utah 
Supreme Court reversed this sentence and ordered that the 
sentences should urun concurrently to afford the Board of Pardons 
the flexibility to adjust the defendant' s prison stay to match 
his progress in rehabilitation and preparation to return to 
society.n Id. at 1302. 
The Court explained this decision stating that § 76-3-401 
requires a trial court, in determining whether to order 
consecutive sentences, to consider not only the "gravity and 
circumstances of the offense," but also the "rehabilitative 
needs of the defendant. . . we find in this case that the trial 
court abused it' s discretion in failing to sufficiently consider 
defendant' s rehabilitative needs in light of his extreme youth 
and the absence of prior violent crimes." Strunk at 1302. 
In State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236, 244 (Utah 1995), the 
Supreme Court again emphasized the importance of allowing the 
Parole Board to asses the progress of the defendant and determine 
the proper time for release. Mr. Smith, being convicted of 
aggravated kidnaping, rape of a child, and sodomy on a child, 
appealed from the trial court' s determination arguing, among 
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other things, that the trial court abused its discretion in 
ordering defendant' s sentences to run consecutively. Despite the 
fact that the trial court properly considered "the gravity and 
circumstances of the offenses and the history, character and 
rehabilitative needs of the defendant," Smith at 244. The Utah 
Supreme Court still reversed the consecutive sentences. This 
decision was based upon the Court' s determination that the trial 
court had abused its discretion by ordering a sentence which 
effectively stripped the Board of Pardons of discretion to take 
into account defendant' s future conduct and possible progress 
toward rehabilitation. Smith, at 245, citing, Strunk, at 1302. 
The Court' s decisions in Smith and Strunk, coupled with the 
statutory mandate of § 76-3-401, require that a consecutive 
sentence should not be imposed without proper consideration of 
the listed factors or in a manner that deprives the Board of 
Pardons of their authority to assess the progress of inmates. 
In Mr. Schweitzer' s case, the sentence imposed by the trial 
court offends both of these principles. The trial court 
completely fails to consider the "history, character, and 
rehabilitative needs of the defendant." Prior to the incident at 
Adolph' s, Mr. Schweitzer had not been convicted of any crime 
involving either a weapon or an act of violence towards another 
human being. Mr. Schweitzer' s actions at Adolph' s, although 
egregious, where the result of a drunken scuffle between himself 
and his companion, a friend, in a barroom. The State's witnesses 
have testified that immediately after the stabbing, when Mr. 
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Schweitzer realized what he had done, he hugged the victim and 
told him that he was sorry and that he loved him.(R. 0218). He 
confessed to his therapist shortly after the incident stating; 
They' re telling me that I stabbed Jim, but I don' t 
remember doing that. . . . I remember attacking a door 
in a bar because we were drinking quite a bit. . . but 
I can' t believe I would do a thing like that. . . I 
just can' t. I feel so horrible. . . God, I hope he' s 
OK. (Presentence Report at 12). 
His therapist believes that Mr. Schweitzer1 s account of the 
events on the night of the stabbing "are consistent with 
experiences of individuals who have alcohol-related blackouts." 
She noted that consistent with a typical alcohol blackout, "Mr. 
Schweitzer reported feeling horrified and extremely remorseful 
about his behavior during the blackout." She stated, "At no time 
during his therapy with me did Mr. Schweitzer report anger or any 
intent to harm his friend, Jim Higham." (Presentence Report at 
12). 
Defendant does not suggest that his admissions and remorse, 
coupled with his criminal history, make his bad deed any less 
egregious in terms of the damage that was done to Mr. Higham. 
Certainly it is true that these facts reflect upon the "history 
and the character" of the Defendant such that a sentencing court 
would not see an individual who needed to serve consecutive 
prison and jail terms, but instead as someone who needed the 
opportunity to receive rehabilitation for his drug and alcohol 
problem. Nothing in the record indicates that the trial court 
considered these factors, as is required by Strunk, Smith, and 
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UCA 76-3-401, in sentencing Mr. Schweitzer to consecutive 
sentences. 
Additionally, the presentence investigation report contained 
the recommendation that the Defendant receive counseling for his 
substance abuse problems not only from therapist Valerie Hale, 
Ph.D., Licensed Clinical Psychologist, but also from Ms. Cartier 
who stated "John Schweitzer has had a sever alcohol and drug 
abuse problem for years." "I believe that he needs to have 
mandatory substance abuse counseling and [sic] anger management 
program." (R. Report at 6, 13). Yet, nothing in the record, 
especially not the sentence imposed, suggests that the trial 
court gave these recommendations or Mr. Schweitzer' s 
rehabilitative needs any consideration in sentencing him to 
consecutive rather than concurrent sentences. This failure, on 
the part of the trial court, constitutes an abuse of discretion 
that warrants reversal of Defendant' s sentence. 
Furthermore, the trial court, by adding a mandatory six 
month sentence in the county jail to the Defendant' s 
indeterminate sentence at the Utah State prison, effectively 
abrogated the Parole Board's duties to "monitor [the] defendant's 
subsequent behavior and possible progress toward rehabilitation 
while in prison and to adjust the maximum sentence accordingly." 
As Smith explains, when the legislature enacted 
indeterminate prison sentences, like the "zero to five" sentence 
which Mr. Schweitzer is presently serving for stabbing Mr. 
Higham, the legislature did so with the understanding that the 
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Board of Pardons would have "wide latitude in deciding what a 
maximum sentence ought be." Smith at 244, citing, Strunk at 1301. 
As such the trial Court's sentence is improper in that it 
interferes with the intended function of the Board of Pardons. 
Accordingly, the Defendant' s consecutive sentences should be 
reversed. 
C. The trial court had no authority to sentence Mr, 
Schweitzer to pay child support. 
By sentencing Mr. Schweitzer to pay child support as part of 
his criminal sentence, the trial court exceeded the limits 
proscribed by law. If the sentence imposed exceeds the limits 
prescribed by law, reversal is appropriate. State v. Shelby, 728 
P.2d 987, 988 (Utah 1986); State v. Jolivet. 712 P.2d 843, 844 
(Utah 1986); State v. Peterson. 681 P.2d 1210, 1219 (Utah 1984); 
State v. Harris, 585 P.2d 450, 4553 (Utah 1978). > 
A court may not determine a matter that is not before it. 
Such a determination exceeds the legal authority of the court. 
See, Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 852-4 (Utah 1994). In 
this case, the sentencing judge made a sua sponte determination 
of a matter; namely, the Defendant' s legal obligation to pay 
child support, despite the fact that this matter was not before 
the court that day. Moreover, this matter was at issue in a 
separate civil proceeding in which paternity was disputed. The 
court was aware of this. (R.0362, 0276, Presentence Report at 
7). 
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Because the Defendant' s obligation to pay child support to 
Ms. Cartier was not before the court on the day Mr. Schweitzer 
was sentenced, the court had no jurisdictional authority to raise 
and determine this issue, especially not without the benefit of a 
paternity test. 
Furthermore, Mr. Schweitzer did not abandon his 
constitutional due process rights or those that stem from U.C.A. 
§ 78-45a-2 regarding liability for child support simply because 
he committed a crime. Section§ 78-45a-2 states that "[P]aternity 
may be determined upon. . . the petition of the putative father. 
. . . If paternity has been determined or has been acknowledged 
according to the laws of this state. . . the liabilities of the 
father may be enforced. ..." 
In this case paternity was disputed but never established. 
As such, adding child support to the Defendant' s criminal 
sentence was improper, beyond the jurisdiction of the trial 
court, and evidences an abuse of discretion.4 Moreover, the 
Defendant believes that this action of the trial court, which was 
clearly outside of its authority, adds additional merit to 
Defendant' s argument introduced in section A, above, which 
explains that the trial court' s sentencing should be reversed 
because it was based upon the emotions of the sentencing Judge 
rather than upon appropriate sentencing considerations. 
4
 Subsequent to sentencing, this paternity suit was dropped. Defendant presented this 
argument not for the purpose of avoiding his child support obligations, but instead, to show 
the unfairness of the sentencing procedure. 
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POINT II 
THE SENTENCE IMPOSED BY THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED 
ARTICLE ONE. SECTION NINE OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 
WHICH PROHIBITS TREATING AN ARRESTED OR IMPRISONED 
PERSON WITH "UNNECESSARY RIGOR" 
The severe sentence imposed by the trial court violates 
Article I, Section Nine, of the Utah Constitution, specifically 
with reference to the guarantee that persons arrested not be 
treated with unnecessary rigor. The Defendant submits that the 
protections offered individuals under Article I, Section Nine are 
greater than those guaranteed by parallel provisions of the 
United States Constitution. Mr. Schweitzer1 s argument is based 
on the fact that Article I, Section Nine differs textually from 
its federal counterpart, the Ninth Amendment. Additionally, 
Defendant submits there is a historical basis for interpreting 
Article I, Section Nine to provide greater protection to persons 
arrested. 
The inclusion of the unnecessary rigor provision in Utah's 
Constitution is probably in some part a result of the early 
Mormon persecution of the 1830's. See L. Arrington & D. Bitton, 
The Mormon Experience,, 76-77 (1979).5 The arrest and murder by 
vigilantes of Joseph and Hyrum Smith in 1844 had profound effect 
5
 Joseph Smith was a self-taught constitution scholar and spent 
countless hours teaching constitutional principles to church 
subordinates. His students later became ecclesiastical and 
political leaders that undoubtedly made significant contributions 
in drafting Utah's numerous constitutions. See Wallentinef 
Heeding The Call Search and Seizure Jurisprudence Under the Utah 
Constitution, Article Ir Section 14, 17 Utah J. Contemp. L. 13 
and n. 57 (1991). 
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on the remaining church members and initiated the Mormon exodus 
to Utah. Id. 
The Mormons7 persecution continued in Utah. The territory 
made six unsuccessful bids for statehood between 1849 and 1887. 
R. Poll and T. Alexander, Utah's History, 243. The primary 
obstacle to statehood was the Mormons7 practice of polygamy. Id. 
Many of the Mormon leaders who moved from Nauvoo to Utah were 
tried and jailed for violations of the Morrill Act of 18626 and 
Edmund Act of 1882.7 The conditions of incarceration were 
described as wretched. Wallentine, supra, at 17. 
When Utah finally achieved statehood in the late 1890's, the 
drafters of the Utah Constitution considered deleting the 
unnecessary rigor language in Article I, Section Nine. Those who 
criticized the provision pointed out that no other state had that 
language in its constitution. See Official Report of the 
Proceedings and Debates of the Convention to Adopt a 
Constitution for the State of Utah. 267-68 b(1898). After 
returning from committee, the provision was retained. Its 
inclusion is a strong indication that the drafters felt a need 
for protections greater than those found in the Federal 
Constitution. Indeed, the history of Mormon persecution from the 
6
 The Morrill Act of 1862 prohibited plural marriages, 
disincorporated the Mormon Church, and restricted church 
ownership of property to $50,000. Utah's History. 244. 
7
 The Edmund Act declared polygamy a felony and defined 
polygamous living or unlawful cohabitation as a misdemeanor. 
Utah's History, 259. 
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1830's until 1896 provides ample evidence that the constitutional 
drafters were well aware of improper treatment of imprisoned 
persons and were committed to ensuring that it did not happen in 
Utah. 
By imposing consecutive sentences on Mr. Schweitzer, 
disposing of every piece of property owned by the Defendant both 
personal and real, and by imposing a child support obligation 
upon the defendant without the benefit of a paternity test, the 
trial court violated this constitutional provision. Therefore 
this matter should be remanded and a proper sentence should be 
imposed. 
CONCLUSION 
The sentence imposed on Mr. Schweitzer was the unfair 
product of the court's obvious dislike for the Defendant. The 
court failed to consider the legally relevant factors in 
sentencing Mr. Schweitzer to consecutive sentences. 
Additionally, the court overstepped its jurisdictional and 
statutory authority by using the forum of the Defendant' s 
sentencing hearing to decide an independent civil matter 
involving the Defendant and then adding the civil judgement to 
the Defendant' s criminal sentence. Further, the trial court' s 
sentence, which includes an order to sell off all of Defendant' s 
real and personal property, violates Article One, Section Nine of 
the Utah State Constitution which prohibits treating the 
imprisoned with "unnecessary rigor." As such Mr. Schweitzer's 
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sentence should be reversed and remanded, and Mr. Schweitzer 
should be sentenced in a fair and just manner. 
KENNETH R. BROWN 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that two (2) true and correct copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellant were mailed this day of 
December, 1996, by first-class mail to the following: 
Barnard Madsen 
Assistant Attorney General 
Utah Attorney General's Office 
160 East 300 South 
Heber Wells Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KAhn Onr+^r 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
Respondent. 
VERIFIED PETITION FOR 
PROTECTIVE ORDER 
Civil No. 95M2- 00/7& Sft 
Judge 
PETITIONER IS ADVISED THAT KNOWINGLY FALSIFYING ANY STATEMENT OR 
INFORMATION TO OBTAIN A PROTECTIVE ORDER MAY SUBJECT PETITIONER TO 
FELONY PROSECUTION UNDER UTAH CODE ANN § 30-6-4(b). 
The Petitioner alleges against the Respondent as follows: 
1. Petitioner is a resident of S ^ m ^  * ^ County, Utah. 
2. The acts giving rise to this Petition occurred in ^>LL /r> n^ I r County, Utah. 
3. Neither party is the step, adoptive, or natural minor child of the other party. 
4. Petitioner is a person 16 years of age or older, or is emancipated pursuant to Utah 
law, who is a cohabitant of Respondent having the following relationship: 
I—' currently or formerly married; 
*=* currently living, or has lived, as if married; 
L-J related by blood or marriage; 
?IES TOi .PETITIONER 
.RESPONDENT 
SUM. CO. SHERIFF 
"POLICE IN Pf/KAMAC 
TO BE RETURNED TO 
C-a have one or more children together; and/or 
"* currendy residing, or has resided, in the same residence. 
5. Petitioner and Respondent are the parents of the following minor children: 
NAME 
I J o K i \ S&cdo S o ) € 
H 
BIRTHDATE 
Aztr J/( fos 
ADDRESS 1 
Oo-m^ 1 
H 
H 
_ 1 
a. These minor children have resided at the following location(s) for the past year 
(give the locations and the dates at each location): 
On or about M '* fo 7<T , 19 , the Respondent threatened, attempted, 
or caused physical harm to the Petitioner, or Respondent committed an act of domestic violence 
as defined in the Utah Code, or there is a substantial likelihood of immediate abuse or domestic 
violence. The harm and/or violence is described as follows: . 
C L X i J Q&-UJLJL *~nrip a J- / / ; V a a ^ J t JUJJ- CL Yyw^o^-^j^ (5<ee.j 
&JI), T AnUAJlM -Lo ~LJlQs6a>e^J> 
Y^l^^a^ J^ 
JM-CUK^C<^UJ tCp C^IA/WI^OJ aJ 
^U^ s&L&^ff^ ^A^rjxO^cJ XL<0> J 4M~d~<iJ @&-*^JUL^A J) ^ 
Vvi£J> 6 ^ 
y£hJ>JUi~lZ<nJlc\ 
$yi^± 
JL^r) fr-edks -Jb-A- ^ ^ > Jhlv*nM^ Mv^J ^ryi^x /jLJ^y^^. 
7. On or about ivig/v & , 19%5, the Respondent threatened, attempted, 
or caused physical harm to one or more of the minors listed in paragraph 5, or Respondent 
committed an act of domestic violence as defined in the Utah Code, or there is a substantial 
likelihood of immediate abuse or domestic violence. The harm and/or violence is described as 
follows: A
 # 4 ) \ i 
/>-^J <JL> a^JL -T^J JUA ~LJ1 ~t^j 4**~+~J ^ J ' ^ J L ^ 
8. The Respondent's use or possession of a weapon may pose a serious threat of 
harm to the Petitioner for the following reason: , /? * '*' 
9. The following is a list (including case numbers) of other civil, criminal or juvenile 
court actions involving Petitioner, Respondent, and/or the minor children^ 
3 
cfs-vi-oon&s 
12-13-95 
11:40 pjn. 
How does it feel to be the biggest mother fuckin cunt fuckin cocaine whore 
bitch mother fuckin scum bag probably in Park Qty huh dig that yeah you 
Uttle fuckin whore bitch. 
?s-</3- <?<*/ 
/y?3 y^^/^ia^ <§ 
^u/fj //'2jT &*4*tJ ytAZu^s Va / ^ ^ y ^ ? ^ w ^ 
,A<V"<TV& ^rr?7tjuy^ci raoA^.. 
\Mjteyy ^ "&?*€*•*» Of* 
^SJiS ^/JOyrtA 4U£tt; 7^f C&7KL ~>lrt/& 
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£jrtA>iJ 
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eftf • ^ 3 -Jhp&htdL f<?<zcs*<v 
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><V» f" '^J^^rf&^zp 54a<2<7rT- tf<*A%<i J 
^/AM&Off 
C 
7oLS—C&ti. 
m ? *)6SAny -fljhi (s 
$?.C- CM&h>U<g "f ystJTsf? 
OsC< </ ~ (ba+rw** A^Jfr /Py?,)?- jClfii&otj {/AJSH/?^ %r?r 
s&ayeaJ ? STtZycrif C&rdas tf^UMteff 
f&fect 
z/fasKffl 
VJC-C&L- 4+Sms cmv.s ~Jt&m£-~At Says X/ft/te *drtf> 
frta*/sy?ffr ?C#&S <fr//>^7V 
^f/, stf<*&,&*_ (jy^Aaa/ yb 
L221 
aivustna 
no. 5 J&LS ^2?s^^_:r_S<J' ' t^^^ 
IffY stistw GuX* <3 
f^Jr- If 4-*#y>o tltt^ .JroTTt* £tau .sf/i*rrA. /y*<p^_. 
,sl£aci0X • 
/Ma*.. !</ ' /?/rJr^(&t&*>i- ^LC- ~^}JL^^Ji*itt /*t, tivcbrtrt* 
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yfaA*<s / <JUJC^- J** sKLGzve* -
S 
? 
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10. Petitioner also requests relief on behalf of the following family and household 
WHEREFORE: Petitioner respectfully prays that this Court grant the following relief: 
1. Issue an immediate Ex Parte Protective Order with the following demands and 
provisions (Check desired sections): 
" Restrain the Respondent from attempting, committing or threatening to 
commit abuse or domestic violence against Petitioner. 
" Restrain the Respondent from attempting, committing or threatening to 
commit abuse or domestic violence against the minors and the other designated family 
and household members. 
^ Prohibit the Respondent from direcdy or indirectly contacting, harassing, 
telephoning, or otherwise communicating with the Petitioner. 
" Order the Respondent to vaeate and stay away from the residence of 
Petitioner located 21:^4/4 "VTliT-r^t^iJ AMrj. c^J (Lv^p /1<^L^^<^^L^<^ 
and prohibit the Respondent from terminating or interfering with tl& utility serves to 
the residence. /^QA~JU^C.O> 7^\JUX^JJ-
" Order the Respondent to stay away from Petitioner's school, place of 
employment, and other places frequented by Petitioner, the minor children and the other 
designated family or household members. These places are as identified by the following 
I " Prohibit the Respondent from purchasing, using, or possessing a firearm 
or other weapon designated by the court, including: 
4 
ESI Award possession of the following residence, automobile and/or other 
essential personal effects, described as follows: 
and order a law enforcement officer to accompany Petitioner to the parties' residence to 
ensure that Petitioner is safely restored to possession of these items. 
l—I Order a law enforcement officer to supervise Respondent's removal of 
essential personal belongings from the residence. 
Grant Petitioner temporary custody of the following minor children: 
Ai^UUy^J 
2. Order the Respondent to appear at a hearing on this Petition, which hearing shall 
be held: 
Date: ' / > / ? * 
Time: /Oc/frm 
Place:
 3 L u ^ ^ ' \ & u J ^ (h^V \ W * e. Q D A O A W U>- ^ 6 
3. After the hearing, issue a Protective Order with the following demands and 
provisions (Check desired sections): 
* All of the relief requested in the Ex Parte Protective Order. 
• Order the Respondent removed and excluded from the Petitioner s 
residence, located at: 34M AlOn ', 4or XD-r. <\^A Cg^y, pa, S j o S e 3 u^J-
5 
I» Specify child visitation arrangements for Respondent, including a denial 
of visitation or supervised visitation, if appropriate, including the following: 
X ^ V M C A o*v \Ti-bAdiV* C W -
Restram the Respondent from using drugs and/or alcohol prior to or during 
visitation. 
« Order the Department of Family Services to conduct an investigation into 
the allegation of child abuse. 
•23 Restrain the Respondent from removing the parties' minor children from 
the jurisdiction of the court. 
c " Order the Respondent to pay child support to the Petitioner in the amount 
of $ ( J66 — per month, plus one half of the Petitioner's work-related day 
care expenses incurred on behalf of the parties' minor children, pursuant to the Uniform 
Child Support Guidelines. 
1—1 Order the Respondent to pay spousal support in the amount of 
$ per month. 
• Order the Respondent to pay Petitioner's and/or the minor children's 
medical expenses in the amount of $ suffered as a result of the abuse 
in this action. 
" Order the Respondent to participate in the electronic monitoring program 
administered by the Department of Corrections 
6 
4. Order any other relief that the court considers necessary for the safety and welfare 
of the Petitioner and the minor children, including the following: 
v
-/*, ^ ^U, Q>XA ( U . 
\ W V \ A I A < ^ iJOC ^ U L C ^ > 
/h ,^J> £<.p. ' - ^ ^ g ^ 
DATED: l^r^L^spy / ? / ^ J T . 
State of Utah 
S n w v p ^ V County 
( ss: 
) 
Being sworn, I state that I am the Petitioner in this matter; that I have read this Petition, 
and that the statements in it are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and information, 
that I believe I am en tided to the relief requested, and that this Petition is not being used for 
harassment, abuse of process or delay. 
Petitioner 
Subscribed and sworn to before me on / y - L)cfc - *? 6 
:" • • • '^ KAREN G. ROBINSON 
/ - v'-U i > \ H0TAR1FVBIK'STATE <t UTAH 
\*5 £ ° j i c ) 50 WEST WANSHIP ROAD 
\ W J ^ViV WANSHJP. UT 84017 
COMM. EXP. 4-6-96 
My Commission Expires 
-z± • L 
Clerk orJ)f6tary Public 
Residing at £<\ cx^ct ~/( r*. <->** 
Serve Respondent at: U 
SuJ^j^O (DaJa<0 
^n 
*T 
